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FOREWORD

BIOETHICS
CAROL ANN MOONEY*

The bioethical debates of the past decade have brought
into focus a fundamental issue-whether the proper role of
law is to protect the welfare of persons governed or to preserve their right to self-determination. The appropriateness
of a given medical procedure is at base an ethical and religious determination. The pluralism of American society and
respect for the moral integrity of the individual have led to
the general conclusion that medical care decisions should be
made by the patient.
In order to implement the right to autonomous decisionmaking, the law has concentrated its efforts upon structuring
a procedure which affords the patient freedom to make a
substantive decision. This emphasis upon procedure rather
than substance is misleading. It gives the illusion that the law
has cleverly avoided making any normative decisions and has
conveniently left that burden with the individual. In reality,
however, the law evidences a fundamental moral decision, a
determination that autonomy is the first good.
Elizabeth Bouvia's dealings with the California courts
during the past several years have exposed the substantive issues which are inevitably intertwined with the process of protecting autonomy. Elizabeth Bouvia is now 28 years old. She
is a quadriplegic, cerebral palsy victim who is bedridden. Because she is unable to orally ingest sufficient nutrients, Ms.
Bouvia is nourished through a naso-gastric feeding tube. In
1983 she sought the right to be cared for in a public hospital
while she intentionally starved herself to death. Her request
forced the court to consider whether there are any inherent
moral limitations upon a person's right to self-determination,
limitations which should be legally enforced. Ms. Bouvia was
denied the judicial assistance needed to accomplish her goal.
In April 1986, however, a California Appeals Court upheld
her right to refuse the feeding tube. The Court found that
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the right to refuse treatment is basic and fundamental and
"its exercise requires no one's approval."
In contrast, the right to demand treatment may not be so
far reaching. A number of reasons may support the difference in breadth, chief among which is that responding to the
demands of one patient may result in neglect of another,
while refusal of treatment never creates such conflicts. The
laetrile controversy.of the late seventies, however, indicates
that even if the rights of others are not directly affected, the
law is still willing to impose some protective limitations upon
the right to control one's destiny. The Supreme Court refused the pleas of terminally ill cancer patients and their
spouses to enjoin the federal government from interfering
with the interstate shipment and sale of laetrile, a drug not
approved under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
In this issue of the Journal, Dr. C. Everett Koop, Surgeon General of the United States, and Mr. Edward Grant, a
lawyer with Americans United for Life, examine living will
legislation and judicial decisions regarding withdrawal of lifeprolonging treatment. They conclude that in the name of autonomy, the legal and ethical prohibitions against euthanasia
have been weakened. The article emphasizes that decisional
processes created for incompetent patients should be evaluated not only in the narrow context of whether a particular
patient's right to self-determination is preserved, but the process should also be judged in light of its impact on society as a
whole. Current procedures presume that the only problem is
the over-treated terminally ill patient. As a result, these procedures encourage a philosophy which views death as a desired outcome. Koop and Grant believe this perspective creates a danger that, in the guise of protecting the integrity of
personal decision-making, the fundamental interest of all citizens in the protection of their lives will be compromised.
Professor George Smith's article discusses the question of
self-determination in the context of the new procreational
technology. He advocates legislation limiting the use of artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization to married women.
Professor Smith concludes that the Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental right to remain fertile as well as a
right to avoid conception, but that the Court has not recognized a fundamental right to conceive. Therefore, laws limiting access to procreational technology only need a rational
basis. Smith believes the state's interest in promoting the institution of marriage and the raising of children in a traditional family setting provide such a rational basis.
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The articles in this symposium deal with diverse issues.
At the core of each discussion, however, is a recognition that
it is impossible to respond in a value-free way to the issues
arising with the rapid expansion of medical technology. A
task force of the Child Neurology Society recently determined that adult brain death criteria may not be adequate for
some children and the task force circulated a draft of brain
death criteria for children. In a discussion of that draft, Mr.
Ellis, a member of the Hunton & Williams law firm, points
out that even brain death criteria, which identify a scientific
event, are not universally seen as morally neutral. The definition of the event and the selection of the scientific criteria are
based on moral criteria.
Two articles written by Notre Dame law students appear
in this issue. David Kessler's article concerns the rights of
children to refuse life-saving treatment on religious grounds.
While the courts have been unanimous in denying a child's
parents the right to forego, on religious grounds, life-sustaining treatment for their child, the criteria for allowing the
child himself to refuse treatment are unclear. Kessler distinguishes unemancipated minors from those minors who are as
responsible for themselves as any adult, and he argues for the
right of emancipated minors to make decisions concerning
their own medical treatment.
Karen McCartan has surveyed the legal, ethical and public policy issues attending the practice of in vitro fertilization.
Like Professor Smith, she argues that some limits be placed
on the availability of procreational technology. Both England
and Australia have imposed regulations on the practice of in
vitro fertilization in those countries, yet curiously, the United
States lags behind in regulatory action. McCartan proposes
criteria, based in part on the Australian regulations, which
should govern the future practice of in vitro fertilization in
this country.
The way our legislatures and courts respond to the
emerging bioethical issues will have a profound impact upon
the development of our society. This Journal issue hopes to
contribute to the ongoing debate by emphasizing the social
and moral dimensions of issues which are often examined
only in light of their impact upon the individual.

